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Non-technical summary 
In the period 2000-2008, more than one third of venture capital-backed companies worldwide received 
financing from venture capitalists that were not located in the same country as these companies. This 
paper offers a comprehensive description of how microeconomic as well as macroeconomic factors, 
which likely affect the availability and profitability of investment opportunities at home and abroad, 
influence the internationalization patterns. To carry out this comprehensive description, we study the 
effects these factors have on internationalization patterns from four different perspectives. First, from 
the perspective of a venture capitalist we analyze its cross-border and domestic deals. Second, from 
the perspective of the portfolio company we investigate the likelihood that a foreign venture capitalist 
participates in a particular deal. Third, from the perspective of the portfolio companies’ country we 
examine the number of cross-border deals in this country. Fourth, in a bilateral country setting, in 
which we combine the macroeconomic factors of the venture capitalists’ and the portfolio companies’ 
countries, we focus on the number of cross-border venture capital deals between these two countries. 
Our analyses from these four different perspectives provide a core understanding of the factors that 
drive internationalization within venture capital industries from different angles. To fulfill this task, 
we use a new dataset on worldwide venture capital investments.  
The key results from our four perspective analysis can be summarized as follows: domestically 
experienced venture capitalists seem to be able to exploit the advantages from internationalization 
more effectively than their less experienced counterparts. Foreign venture capitalists are more likely to 
participate in larger deals, especially when the portfolio company is located in a small country. 
Another finding is that companies from the IT, machinery, and biotech sectors are more likely to be 
financed by foreign venture capitalists than companies in other industries. Internationalization patterns 
are shaped not only by the characteristics of the venture capitalist, the portfolio company and the deal, 
but also by macroeconomic factors. Countries with higher expected economic growth, in which more 
promising investment opportunities for venture capitalists are likely to be generated, stimulate venture 
capital activity from domestic as well as foreign venture capitalists. A higher stock market 
capitalization encourages domestic venture capitalists to invest more both at home and abroad.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze   
Im Zeitraum von 2000 bis 2008 war bei mehr als einem Drittel der mit Venture Capital finanzierten 
Unternehmen mindestens ein ausländischer Risikokapitalgeber beteiligt. Die vorliegende Studie 
untersucht, welche mikro- und makroökonomischen Faktoren, die das Vorhandensein und die 
Profitabilität von Investitionsmöglichkeiten im In- und Ausland bestimmen, die Internationalisierung 
der Venture-Capital-Branche beeinflussen. Wir untersuchen den Einfluss dieser Faktoren auf die 
Internationalisierungsmuster aus vier verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Erstens untersuchen wir die 
grenzüberschreitenden und inländischen Transaktionen aus Sicht der einzelnen Risikokapitalgeber. 
Zweitens untersuchen wir die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein ausländischer Risikokapitalgeber an einer 
bestimmten Transaktion beteiligt ist aus Sicht der einzelnen Portfoliounternehmen. Drittens 
analysieren wir die Anzahl grenzüberschreitender Transaktionen aus Sicht einzelner Länder. Viertens 
untersuchen wir die Anzahl grenzüberschreitender Venture-Capital-Transaktionen aus Sicht von 
Länderpaaren. Die letztgenannte Sichtweise erlaubt die gleichzeitige Betrachtung von 
makroökonomischen Faktoren des Landes des Risikokapitalgebers und des Portfoliounternehmens. 
Unsere aus diesen vier verschiedenen Blickwinkeln gewonnenen Ergebnisse verbessern das 
Verständnis für die treibenden Kräfte der Internationalisierung der Venture-Capital-Branche. Für diese 
Untersuchungen verwenden wir einen neuen Datensatz weltweiter Venture-Capital-Investitionen. 
Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse können wie folgt zusammengefasst werden: Für Risikokapitalgeber, die 
bereits Erfahrungen auf dem heimischen Markt gesammelt haben, scheinen die Vorteile der 
Internationalisierung größer zu sein, als für jene mit geringer Erfahrung. Ausländische 
Risikokapitalgeber nehmen eher an großen Transaktionen teil. Dies ist vor allem der Fall, wenn das 
Portfoliounternehmen in einem kleinen Land angesiedelt ist. Außerdem werden Unternehmen der IT-, 
Maschinenbau-, und Biotechnologiebranche eher von ausländischen Risikokapitalgebern finanziert als 
Unternehmen in anderen Branchen. Des Weiteren werden Internationalisierungsmuster nicht nur von 
den Eigenschaften des Risikokapitalgebers, des Portfoliounternehmens und der Transaktion bestimmt, 
sondern auch von einer Reihe makroökonomischer Faktoren beeinflusst. Länder mit einem hohen 
erwarteten Wirtschaftswachstum, in denen erfolgversprechende Investitionsmöglichkeiten zu erwarten 
sind, ziehen Venture-Capital-Investitionen sowohl inländischer als auch ausländischer 
Risikokapitalgeber an. Eine höhere Kapitalisierung des Aktienmarktes ermutigt inländische 
Risikokapitalgeber nicht nur zu höheren inländischen, sondern auch zu höheren ausländischen 
Investitionen.  
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1 Introduction 
Venture capitalists (VCs) are often regarded as purely local investors that do not venture beyond their 
countries’ borders (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 1999, Dai and Cumming 2008, Bengtsson and Ravid 
2009). This picture is driven by the nature of venture capital deals, which are typically investments in 
opaque risky ventures where information asymmetries between the entrepreneur and the VC are 
particularly pronounced (e.g., Amit et al. 1998) and where hands-on management support and control 
is required. However, on the basis of a comprehensive dataset, we find that cross-border deals 
accounted for 33.4 percent of worldwide total venture capital deals in the period 2000-2008. Thus, in 
more than one third of the companies that received venture capital financing a foreign VC was 
involved.  
Research that goes beyond making cross-country comparisons of local VCs’ investments and fund 
raising (starting with Jeng and Wells 2000, and including a couple of further papers, such as, recently, 
Lerner et al. 2009) towards studying the cross-border investment patterns of VCs and the motives 
behind their internationalization efforts and investment location choice is still in its infancy (see 
Wright et al. 2005). One strand of literature within this rather new research field looks into the impact 
different legal and institutional systems have on the contracts, governance structures and securities’ 
types in domestic and cross-border deals (Kaplan et al. 2007, Lerner and Schoar 2005, Cumming 2005 
and Cumming et al. 2009). Another strand of literature, which analyzes motives behind cross-border 
venture capital investments, is grounded on relatively small samples of VCs or portfolio companies or 
on case studies (e.g., Mäkelä and Maula 2006, Bruner and Chaplinsky 2002, Ribeiro et al. 2006, Dixit 
and Jayaraman 2001, Wright et al. 2002, Manigart et al. 2006). A recent analysis by Aizenman and 
Kendall (2008) offers an interesting description of worldwide flows. They analyze the driving factors 
behind international venture capital and private equity investments using aggregated venture capital 
and private equity flows between country pairs.  
Our study offers a comprehensive description of how microeconomic characteristics as well as 
macroeconomic factors relate to the internationalization patterns. These factors likely shape the trade-
off between risks and expected returns of VCs’ cross-border and domestic investments. More 
specifically, when investing abroad, VCs may benefit through exploiting foreign investment 
opportunities and through diversifying their portfolios across countries, but these foreign investments 
likely come at higher costs than domestic investments. The microeconomic characteristics we focus on 
are the VC’s domestic experience, deal size and industry affiliation of the portfolio company. In 
addition, we employ traditional macroeconomic factors that are related to cross-border activities, such 
as the countries’ expected economic growth, stock market capitalization, innovativeness as well as the 
legal and fiscal environments in the VC country and the portfolio company (PC) country.  
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To carry out this comprehensive description, we use four different perspectives that allow us to 
investigate microeconomic characteristics and macroeconomic factors. First, we take the perspective 
of the VC and investigate how microeconomic characteristics and macroeconomic factors relate to the 
number of the VC’s cross-border and domestic deals. Second, we take the perspective of the portfolio 
company and analyze whether or not a foreign VC is involved in the deal with this PC. Third, at the 
PC-country level, we investigate the number of deals in this country in which foreign VCs participate. 
Fourth, in a bilateral country setting, which has some parallels to the approach used by Aizenman and 
Kendall (2008), we combine the VC-country and PC-country macroeconomic factors and analyze their 
impact on the number of cross-border venture capital deals between these two countries 
simultaneously. Our analyses from these four different perspectives provide a core understanding of 
the factors that affect internationalization within venture capital industries from different angles.  
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. Most of the above mentioned factors we find to be 
statistically and economically significant. In particular, a VC’s domestic experience goes hand in hand 
with higher cross-border activity. Foreign VCs are more likely to participate in larger deals, especially 
when the PC is located in a small country. Countries with higher expected economic growth, in which 
more promising investment opportunities for VCs are expectedly generated, stimulate venture capital 
investments from domestic as well as from foreign VCs. A higher stock market capitalization does not 
only encourage domestic venture capital investments and, thus, the development of the local venture 
capital industries, but countries with high stock market capitalization also invest more intensively 
abroad compared to countries with low stock market capitalization. These results are robust towards 
the different perspectives of our analysis, varying sample sizes and model specifications.  
Besides its academic contribution, this paper is of interest to policy makers who want to foster the 
growth of the domestic venture capital industry and domestic companies. When taking into account 
the international dimension in venture capital finance, public policy becomes much more complicated, 
as public policy actions not only affect the domestic and foreign investments of the VCs located in this 
particular country, but also foreign VCs’ participation in this country. Our results suggest that some 
factors that spur local venture capital industry development, such as viable stock markets, may boost 
not only domestic, but also foreign venture capital investments in this country.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 introduces the dataset, presents some 
statistics on worldwide cross-border and domestic venture capital deals, and introduces the four 
perspectives we employ in our analyses. In Section 4, we derive hypotheses on factors that are 
potentially relevant for cross-border and domestic investments. In Section 5, we provide the results 
from our econometric analyses for each of the four perspectives. Section 6 summarizes the results and 
gives directions for further research.  
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2 Worldwide venture capital deals and internationalization 
We use data on worldwide venture capital deals from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database, which 
offers information on mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings as well as private equity and 
venture capital deals. Recently, the existence of this database has started to be registered by 
researchers working in the field of venture capital and private equity (e.g., Goossens et al. 2008, 
Abdesselam et al. 2008, Grimpe and Hussinger 2009, Bloom et al. 2008, Brav et al. 2009). For the 
purposes of this paper, we collected information on worldwide venture capital deals within the period 
2000-2008, in particular on the geographical locations of the VCs and their PCs. We started with 
38,125 total (i.e. domestic and cross-border) deals. Since, in our analysis, we (i) include only non-
financial PCs, (ii) exclude corporations and governments as VCs and, finally, (iii) exclude countries 
for which we do not have macroeconomic data, the number of deals in our final dataset drops to 
23,826. The majority of these deals are financed by a syndicate of several VCs. A syndicated deal 
consists of several connections between single VCs and the PC. The number of these connections, 
which we call links hereafter, in a particular deal thus equals the number of VCs involved in this deal. 
In total, we count 58,377 VC-PC links in our final dataset. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the worldwide venture capital internationalization within the period 
2000-2008. It aggregates the number of domestic, intra- and intercontinental VC-PC links included in 
our final dataset by continents. Domestic links of Northern American VCs (including the United States 
and Canada) constitute, with more than 34,000 links in the period 2000-2008, by far the largest figure, 
followed by European VCs with nearly 11,200 links to domestic PCs. Intracontinental connections are 
intensive within Europe, with more than 3,400 cross-border VC-PC links. The bulk of intercontinental 
links take place between Europe and the United States in both directions, with more than 2,600 links 
of European VCs to PCs in the United States and nearly 1,600 links in the opposite direction. 
We use this dataset to analyze the venture capital internationalization from four different perspectives: 
the VC perspective, the PC perspective, the PC-country perspective and, finally, the bilateral country 
perspective. For the VC perspective, we count the number of cross-border links for each VC and each 
year, i.e. all links where the PC country differs from the VC country. Moreover, we count the number 
of domestic links for each VC and each year, i.e. all links where the PC country is the same as the VC 
country. For the PC perspective, we create a dummy variable equal to one if a foreign VC participates 
in the deal and zero otherwise. We supplement the PC perspective with the PC-country perspective. 
Here, for each PC country and each year, we count the number of deals in which one or more foreign 
VCs participate. Finally, for the bilateral country perspective, we count the number of cross-border 
links between each VC country and each PC country in each year. Thus, for the VC and the bilateral 
country perspective, each link between a VC and a PC counts once. For the PC and PC-country 
perspective, each deal counts once, even if it is financed by more than one VC and, thus, consists of 
several links. 
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Table 1 provides information on the dependent variables in our four perspectives. Panel A reveals that 
our final dataset contains 8,211 VCs. An average VC has 5.68 links to PCs in its home country and 
1.45 links to PCs abroad. As Panel B demonstrates, we count 23,826 deals in total; in 7,947 deals at 
least one foreign VC participates. Panel C shows the number of domestic and foreign deals by the 
country of the PC. By far, the highest number of venture-backed PCs is located in the United States, 
where we count 9,370 domestic and 2,854 cross-border deals. Panel D depicts, for selected countries 
with the largest cross-border venture capital inflows, the number of bilateral cross-border VC-PC 
links. The most intensive connection is between the United States and the United Kingdom, with 663 
links between US VCs and portfolio companies in the United Kingdom, and 923 links in the opposite 
direction.  
Table 2 demonstrates how the number of domestic and cross-border venture capital deals has 
developed over time (Panel A) and across industries (Panel B). After the burst of the high-tech bubble, 
the number of venture capital deals experienced a strong decline in 2001 and 2002. The following two 
years marked a recovery. After stagnation in 2005 and 2006, venture capital activity strongly increased 
in 2007. Along with the financial crisis, it rapidly declined in 2008. The fraction of cross-border on 
total deals varied substantially over time, reaching its peak in 2001 with 37.1 percent, and two years 
later, the lowest point with 29.4 percent. Concerning the distribution of deals across industries, we 
observe a high concentration in particular industries. During our sample period, most PCs (42.8 
percent) were in the computer, IT, and internet services industries. The most pronounced 
internationalization was in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and life sciences industries, in which a 
foreign VC participated in nearly every second deal.  
Given the lack of systematic research in venture capital financing outside the US, we are limited in our 
ability to calibrate the completeness of the Zephyr database. Nonetheless, we can assess its 
completeness by comparing it with the data in other studies and available in other databases. In the in 
Zephyr database, we count 38,125 domestic and cross-border venture capital deals in the period 2000-
2008. The most recent paper by Lerner et al. (2009) is based on the Capital IQ database and includes 
45,207 venture capital and growth capital deals worldwide from 1984 through September 2008. 
Unfortunately, the paper does not provide information on the number of deals within the period 2000-
2008 so that it is not directly comparable to our sample. The most widely used database in venture 
capital research, the Thomson VentureXpert database, covers 38,515 companies when searching for 
worldwide targets involved in venture related deals within the period 2000-2008. Although the Zephyr 
coverage seems to be a bit worse than that of Thomson, the huge advantage is that Zephyr offers better 
information on deal volume and PC industry affiliation than Thomson. For our purposes, we are very 
much convinced that these advantages outweigh the disadvantage since, among other factors, we are 
interested in the role of the deal size and the PCs’ industry affiliation in internationalization patterns.  
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3 Factors behind cross-border venture capital investments and our hypotheses 
The strategy of this paper is to investigate, from the four different perspectives, which factors shape 
venture capital internationalization. While we are able to access the impact of the VC and deal 
characteristics on cross-border activity only in selected perspectives, we include macroeconomic 
factors in all four perspectives. 
3.1 VC domestic experience (H1) 
It is widely believed that VCs are purely local investors that do not venture beyond their countries’ 
borders (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 1999, Dai and Cumming 2008, Bengtsson and Ravid 2009). This 
picture is driven by the nature of venture capital deals, which are typically investments in opaque risky 
ventures where information asymmetries between the entrepreneur and the VC are particularly 
pronounced, and which therefore require intensive pre-investment screening, post-investment hands-
on management support, and control (see Amit et al. 1998). These activities raise VCs’ costs and these 
costs are likely to be higher for cross-border than for domestic deals (e.g., Wright et al. 2005, 
Cumming and Johan 2006b). However, as VCs gain experience, we conjecture that their cost of 
information gathering and processing will decrease not only in domestic but also in cross-border deals. 
Thus, they might dare to cross borders more and more often and hereby exploit promising investment 
opportunities abroad as well as build up geographically diversified portfolios. Therefore, in the VC 
perspective, we expect the number of cross-border deals to be positively related to the experience that 
the VC has accumulated in its home country in the past. 
3.2 Deal size (H2) 
Large venture capital deals are usually financed through a syndicate of several VCs who profit from 
diversification since syndication allows them to split their limited funds across more portfolio 
companies (Lockett and Wright 2001, Manigart et al. 2006). As the number of VCs typically increases 
with the deal size, we conjecture that the probability that at least one of the VCs on board is a 
foreigner will increase with the deal size (e.g., Lerner et al. 2009). We expect this effect to be 
particularly pronounced in small countries, in which the chance to find a domestic partner is 
presumably lower than in large countries. Moreover, we expect more cross-border deals in countries 
with larger deals, as it might become more and more difficult to find domestic syndication partners as 
the deal size rises.  
3.3 Expected growth (H3) 
High expected economic growth enforces venture capital activity (Armour and Cumming 2006, 
Gompers and Lerner 1999, Cumming and MacIntosh 2006), as many attractive investment 
opportunities arise in high-growth countries. More profitable investment opportunities in their home 
country will encourage VCs’ domestic investments while, when they are constrained in raising 
additional funds, VCs will reduce their investments abroad. Hence, we suppose that higher expected 
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growth in their home country has a positive impact on VCs’ domestic and negative impact on their 
cross-border investments. In addition, we expect higher expected growth to attract foreign VCs. Thus, 
it might positively relate to the probability that a foreign VC participates in a given deal. For the PC-
country perspective, we suppose an increase in the expected growth of the PC country to lead to a 
higher number of cross-border deals.  
3.4 Market capitalization (H4) 
Not only does the general finance and growth literature suggest that financial development is 
beneficial for attracting foreign capital (e.g., Alfaro et al. 2004), but the venture capital literature also 
finds out that countries with higher market capitalizations receive more venture capital from abroad 
than countries with low capitalization (Aizenman and Kendall 2008). The recent literature argues that 
a developed stock market encourages venture capital investments (Jeng and Wells 2000, Black and 
Gilson 1998, Bascha and Walz 2002) because it offers a profitable exit route and supports VCs’ 
reputation building and fund raising (Gompers 1996). Thus, developed stock markets go hand in hand 
with developed venture capital industries. Consequently, countries with less developed stock markets 
may not only have few domestic investments, but they may also source few cross-border investments. 
Moreover, in countries with less viable stock markets, the probability of a foreign VC’s participation 
might be higher compared to countries with more developed stock markets where many large domestic 
VCs exist. In line with this reasoning, we expect more cross-border deals in countries with a higher 
market capitalization. 
3.5 Innovativeness (H5) 
There is no doubt that venture capital investments and innovative activity are closely related. 
However, the causality seems to be bi-directional. Not only do venture capital investments stimulate 
innovation (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000), but innovations also attract VCs’ investments (e.g., Ueda 
and Hirukawa 2008). Therefore, we suppose that high innovation levels spur the development of local 
venture capital industries. Concretely, we expect a higher level of innovativeness in the past to 
increase the number of current domestic deals. At the same time, when VCs are constrained in fund 
raising, they will reduce their foreign investments. Moreover, foreign VCs are more likely to invest in 
countries with higher innovativeness. This increases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation as 
well as the number of deals financed from abroad. 
3.6 Legal environment (H6) 
Starting with the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), a large literature has demonstrated a 
systematic relationship between a country’s legal framework and its financial activities. In the context 
of venture capital, studies have already shown that the legal framework relates to the size of the 
countries’ venture capital industries (Armour and Cumming 2006, Leleux and Surlemount 2003), to 
the valuations and returns (Cumming and Walz 2009, Lerner and Schoar 2005), to the quality of 
support that VCs provide to their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al. 2008) as well as to the structure 
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of venture capital contracts and deal characteristics (Lerner and Schoar 2004). Cumming and Johan 
(2007) demonstrate that good laws lead to more efficient deal screening and faster deal origination. 
Moreover, Cumming and Johan (2006a) argue that a higher quality of a country legal system 
facilitates exits. In our context, we expect a more favorable legal environment to induce VCs to invest 
more often at home and less often abroad. We also expect that more favorable legal environment 
attracts foreign VCs and, thus, increases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation and the 
number of deals financed from abroad.  
3.7 Personal taxation (H7) 
A high effective personal income tax rate, on the one hand, might dampen venture capital investments 
in a country because it discourages the accumulation of human capital in this country, reflected, for 
example, in the number of innovative entrepreneurs, researchers or highly qualified managers (e.g., 
Trostel 1993). According to this view, we would expect that high personal taxation induces domestic 
VCs to flee from this country by increasing their investments abroad and reducing their activities at 
home. We would also expect that high personal taxes discourage foreign VCs from entering this 
country, so that the probability of a foreign VC’s participation and the number of deals financed from 
abroad decreases when personal taxation increases.  
But, on the other hand, as Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon (2007) point out, higher personal 
taxation might increase individuals’ incentives to become entrepreneurs when they are able to exploit 
the option to incorporate. If this is the case, higher personal income taxes can foster entrepreneurship 
and raise the demand for venture capital finance. They argue that in the early development stage, when 
the business experiences losses, entrepreneurs do not incorporate. Then, they are able to save taxes by 
offsetting these losses against other personal income. Once the business becomes profitable, the 
entrepreneurs incorporate in order to avoid high personal taxes. According to this view, high personal 
taxation decreases investments abroad and increases investments at home. Moreover, the higher 
entrepreneurial activity likely attracts venture capital from abroad, and thereby increases the 
probability of a foreign VC’s participation and the number of deals financed from abroad. 
3.8 Our hypotheses and other potentially relevant factors  
Table 3 summarizes the above discussion in seven hypotheses for each of the four perspectives. Table 
4 offers descriptions, sources and summary statistics for the variables, which we use in the main part 
of our analysis. For the countries’ innovativeness we employ business R&D expenditures in our main 
estimations, and use patent counts as an alternative measure in a robustness section. As a measure of 
the legal environment pertinent to venture capital activities, we employ a venture capital legal index 
from the World Competitiveness Yearbook. We employ more general legal indices as alternative 
measures in the robustness section.  
Our hypotheses cover only a part of the factors which are likely to be relevant for cross-border venture 
capital investments. We do not consider further characteristics of VCs (such as their size) and further 
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country-specific factors (such as the law tradition in a particular country or cultural and geographical 
proximity between the VC and PC country) because we employ econometric approaches that control 
for these time invariant characteristics. Depending on the perspective, we model fixed effects for each 
VC, for each PC country or for each country pair. This allows us to substantially reduce the number of 
coefficients to be estimated. At the same time we control for unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, our 
outcomes are less likely to be subject to criticism with regards to omitted variable bias or model 
misspecification. 
4 Econometric analyses from the four perspectives  
4.1 VC perspective 
We start the VC perspective by looking at how VCs’ domestic experience and the macroeconomic 
factors in their home country are related to each VC’s number of cross-border deals. Thus, the single 
VCs are the cross-sectional units in our panel dataset. To explain the number of cross-border deals, we 
employ the most widely used count data model, the Poisson model (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 1998). 
Since the factors that we consider do not measure all characteristics of the VCs and their home 
countries that may affect their cross-border investments, we model a fixed effect for each VC. In 
addition, we include year dummies to filter out time-varying unobservable effects, such as world 
market developments. The fixed effect estimator excludes VCs without any cross-border deals within 
the period under analysis, since the dependent variable does not vary over time for these VCs. We 
calculate robust standard errors, as suggested by Wooldridge (1999). This specification produces 
consistent estimates under relatively weak assumptions, since only the conditional mean must be 
correctly specified.  
Table 5 displays the results from the fixed effect Poisson regressions for three different specifications. 
Our basic specification (Column 1) reveals the following results, which are, by and large, in line with 
our hypotheses: the VC’s domestic experience significantly increases the number of this VC’s cross-
border deals (H1). When the expected economic growth in their home country increases, VCs reduce 
the number of their cross-border deals (H3). A higher stock market capitalization in their home 
country leads to more cross-border deals (H4). Finally, a more favorable legal environment, measured 
by the venture capital legal index, and higher personal tax rates reduce the number of cross-border 
deals (H6 and H7b). The economic effects of these variables on cross-border deals are quite 
remarkable. A 1 percentage point increase in the expected economic growth in the VC home country 
(e.g., from its mean of 3.6% to 4.6%) leads to 14.6 percent fewer cross-border deals, whereas an 
increase in the stock market capitalization by 10 percentage points (e.g., from its mean of 90% to 
100% of GDP) increases the number of cross-border deals by 3.6 percent. 
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Since our dataset covers countries that differ considerably regarding their economic development, we 
exclude VCs from less developed countries in the second specification. The number of observations 
drops only slightly (from 18,064 to 17,368), because the vast majority of VCs come from developed 
countries.1 All our results based on this subsample are very similar to those from the basic 
specification. In the third specification, we fend off concerns that our results are driven by the United 
States, which has the largest and by far the most developed venture capital industry worldwide. 
Excluding US VCs from our regression reduces the number of observations to 11,968. Despite this 
sharp reduction in the number of observations, most of our results remain very similar to those of the 
first two specifications. More domestic experience and a higher stock market capitalization 
significantly increase the number of cross-border deals, whereas a more favorable legal environment 
and higher expected growth in the VC’s home country significantly reduce the number of cross-border 
deals. While the impact of taxation, which was only significant at the 15% level in the first and second 
specification, diminishes, the innovativeness of the VCs’ home country, measured by business R&D 
expenditures, becomes an important driver of cross-border investments when we exclude the United 
States from our dataset. However, contrary to our hypothesis (H5), VCs located in countries with 
higher local innovativeness carry out more deals abroad. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
high local innovativeness spurs domestic venture capitalists’ sophistication, which makes crossing 
borders easier.  
We complement the VC perspective by counting the number of each VC’s domestic deals in each year 
and analyze how macroeconomic factors influence the domestic activities employing, again, a fixed 
effect Poisson model and the same VC-country macroeconomic factors as in the cross-border setting. 
Compared to the cross-border setting, the number of observations in the domestic setting is much 
higher for two reasons. First, since the fixed effect estimator excludes VCs without any deals within 
the period under analysis, we have fewer VCs (i.e. cross-sectional units) in the cross-border than in the 
domestic setting. Second, domestic deal regressions are based on nine years and the cross-border deal 
regressions are based on eight years since we use in the latter regressions the VCs’ lagged domestic 
experience, which we constructed from the dataset. 
The analysis of domestic deals is grounded in the vast literature analyzing cross-country differences in 
venture capital investments starting with the seminal paper by Jeng and Wells (2000). However, while 
the existing studies usually do not distinguish between VCs’ domestic and cross-border investments 
(i.e. they deal with total aggregated investments of VCs located in a particular country), we focus in 
this part of our analysis on the deals that VCs carry out in their home countries only.  
The results from the domestic deals regressions, which we present in Table 6, are broadly consistent 
with the findings from the existing cross-country studies and with our hypotheses. The basic 
                                                 
1  The list of developed countries is based on the GDP per capita and contains the following countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
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specification (Column 1) reveals that the number of domestic deals increases with countries’ expected 
economic growth (H3), market capitalization (H4) and innovativeness (H5). A 1 percentage point 
increase in the expected economic growth in the VC home country leads to 14.2 percent more 
domestic deals. An increase in stock market capitalization by 10 percentage points increases the 
number of the domestic deals by 7.6 percent. A 1 percentage point increase in the innovativeness in 
the VC home country leads to 41.8 percent more domestic deals. The legal environment and personal 
taxation have positive coefficients as suggested by H6 and H7b, they are, however, not statistically 
significant. Similar results hold in the specification based on the sample of developed countries only 
(Column 2) and the sample excluding the United States (Column 3). Personal taxation becomes 
significant at the 10% level in the latter sample.  
4.2 Perspective of the portfolio company 
Now we take the perspective of the PC and analyze what factors affect the probability that a foreign 
VC participates in a particular deal. So, we move from a panel to a cross-sectional setting, with single 
deals being units of observation. We use a logit model (e.g., Hilbe 2009) since our dependent variable 
is binary. Besides the PC-country characteristics (including time varying macroeconomic factors and 
PC-country dummies) and year dummies, we include deal size, an interaction term between the deal 
size and the PC-country size2 and dummy variables for the PCs’ industry affiliation. We calculate 
Huber-White-sandwich corrected standard errors (Huber 1967, White 1980). 
Panel A of Table 7 exhibits the coefficient estimates, which give insights on whether an increase in a 
variable increases or decreases the probability that a foreign VC participates in a deal. However, from 
the coefficient estimates we do not infer how much an increase in a variable increases or decreases the 
probability that a foreign VC participates. Therefore, Panel B shows the marginal effects evaluated at 
the sample means. For the dummy variables the marginal effects are calculated by changing the 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. In order to infer how the deal size affects the probability of the foreign 
VC’s participation, we have to consider that it appears not only as one of the regressors, but that is 
also part of the interaction term and include this impact in the marginal effect of the deal size.  
To gain deeper insights on how the country size changes the marginal effect of the deal size, and thus 
on the effect of the interaction term, Figure 2 delivers the marginal effects of deal size on the 
probability of the foreign VC’s participation at different percentiles of country size. This picture is 
important, since the sign of the coefficient estimate, and thus the marginal effect of the interaction 
term, varies with the country size and the deal size (Ai and Norton 2003). The figure is based on the 
basic specification (Column 1 in Table 7). 
The results with respect to the deal size are in line with our hypothesis (H2). The basic specification 
(Column 1, Panel B), based on the whole sample, reveals that a doubling in the deal size increases the 
                                                 
2  Country size is not employed as a separate regressor because it is included in the country dummies. 
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probability of a foreign VC’s participation by 0.085.3 Figure 2 documents that this effect is less 
important in large than in small countries. For the countries in the smallest size decile, a doubling in 
the deal size increases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation by 0.104, whereas for countries 
in the largest decile, the probability increases only by 0.040. Restricting the sample to developed 
countries only (Column 2) does not change the economic impact of the deal size on the probability of 
a foreign VC’s participation. When we exclude VCs from the United States from the sample (Column 
3), a doubling in the deal size increases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation by 0.126. Thus, 
the effect is much stronger in the ex-US sample (0.126 versus 0.085). This finding further supports our 
reasoning that the probability of a foreign VC’s participation is higher in smaller countries.  
Most other variables have the expected effects on the probability that a foreign VC participates in a 
particular deal. Higher expected growth, higher innovativeness and sounder legal environments attract 
VCs from abroad (H3, H5, H6). For example, a 1 percentage point increase in expected growth 
increases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation by 0.028. Higher market capitalization 
decreases the probability of a foreign VC’s participation (H4). When the market capitalization 
increases by 10 percentage points, this probability decreases by 0.011. Personal income taxes have a 
positive, albeit not significant impact (H7b). PCs operating in the IT, machinery, and biotech sectors 
have a higher probability to attract foreign VCs.  
4.3 Perspective of the portfolio companies’ country 
In the perspective of the PCs’ country we count the number of PCs in each country and year that 
receive venture capital from a foreign VC (from any foreign country) and analyze how this number is 
related to the macroeconomic factors of the PC country. Thus, the PC countries are the cross-sectional 
units in our panel dataset. As for the VC perspective, we use a Poisson model. We model a fixed effect 
for each PC country to capture the unobserved heterogeneity among them and we include year 
dummies. Moreover, we calculate robust standard errors (as suggested in Wooldridge 1999). 
Table 8 shows the results, which are broadly consistent with our hypotheses. The first specification, 
which builds on the whole dataset, already reveals the main patterns: higher expected economic 
growth (H3), market capitalization (H4) and personal income taxes (H7b) and a sounder legal 
environment (H6) lead to more deals being financed from abroad. For example, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the expected growth leads to 25.1 percent more deals financed from abroad. A 10 
percentage point increase in the stock market capitalization raises the number of deals from abroad by 
6.9 percent. The impact of the countries’ innovativeness is positive, but not significant in the basic 
specification (H5). In the second specification, we check whether countries with larger deal sizes (we 
                                                 
3  A doubling in the deal size (starting from value X) increases the value of our regressor, log deal size, by log(2X) – 
log(X)=log(2)=0.693. The marginal effect of the deal size is 0.1232 (see Table 7, Panel B, Column 1). The economic 
effect of a doubling in the deal size can than be calculated as: 0.693*0.1232=0.085.  
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employ the 75th percentile of the log deal size as an additional variable) attract more cross-border 
deals than countries with smaller deal sizes (H2).4 The effect is positive, but insignificant.  
In a next step, we again restrict our dataset to developed countries only (Columns 3 and 4) and we 
exclude the United States from the dataset (Columns 5 and 6). The statistical impact of expected 
economic growth and market capitalization remains very robust towards these varying subsamples. 
The coefficients on all other variables do not change their signs, but their statistical significance 
sometimes varies across different models. As an example, the coefficient on innovativeness becomes 
significantly positive when we exclude developing countries from the dataset.  
4.4 Bilateral country perspective 
Since our analysis reveals that both, the VC-country and the PC-country macroeconomic factors 
influence cross-border venture capital deals, we finally turn to a bilateral country setting in which both 
countries’ macroeconomic factors can be analyzed simultaneously. To trace out whether the results 
discussed so far also hold in a bilateral country perspective, we aggregate the number of VC-PC links 
for each country pair (in both directions separately) and each year. Thus, country pairs are the cross-
sectional units of our panel dataset in the bilateral country perspective. As for the VC and PC 
perspectives, we use a Poisson model. We employ a fixed effect for each country pair. Because of this 
fixed effect, all country pairs without any cross-border activity during the observation period are 
excluded from our regressions. Additionally, we include year dummies and we calculate robust 
standard errors (as suggested in Wooldridge 1999). 
In the bilateral country perspective, this modeling approach has four main advantages: First, we do not 
have to add VC-country and PC-country dummy variables because we model a fixed effect for each 
country pair. This substantially reduces the number of coefficients to be estimated. Second, we gain 
additional degrees of freedom because we do not have to include time invariant bilateral country 
characteristics such as cultural and geographical distance between countries, since these are 
incorporated in the fixed effects. Third, this modeling approach also resolves problems otherwise 
arising from unobserved heterogeneity in bilateral country relationships, which might influence 
bilateral cross-border venture capital flows, such as the level of sympathy of some nations for other 
nations, which, again, is incorporated in the fixed effects. Fourth, this method allows us to include 
VC-country and PC-country macroeconomic factors separately as well as to employ their differences 
(PC country minus VC country). The latter approach might be very much relevant in this bilateral 
country perspective because, for example, VCs from Germany might base their decision on how much 
to invest in France on the difference in the expected growth rates. Moreover, since the coefficients on 
some variables, such as market capitalization, have the same expected sign for the VC and PC country 
(see Table 3), the coefficient on their difference provides insights on whether one of the effects 
prevails. 
                                                 
4  Since the 75 percentile of the deal size cannot be calculated for all country-years, the sample size reduces from 351 to 
283 country-year observations. 
 13  
Panel A of Table 9 depicts the results when we jointly include the macroeconomic factors of the VC 
and PC country. Panel B reports the results when we employ the differences. The findings in Column 
1 of Panel A, which is based on the whole dataset, are again mostly in line with our hypotheses and fit 
nicely into the findings from the previous sections. Higher expected growth and higher personal 
taxation attract VCs from abroad (H3, H7b). Higher market capitalization and innovativeness of both 
countries, the VC and PC country, increase the number of bilateral cross-border deals (H4, H5). The 
estimated impact of the VC-country innovativeness goes in the same direction as in the VC 
perspective. The coefficients on the other variables are not significant. Most of the economic effects 
(which refer here to link count) are in their magnitude very similar to those presented for the country 
perspective (deal count) and VC perspective (link count). In the second specification, we additionally 
check whether countries with large deals attract more cross-border investments (H2). This effect is 
insignificant. The effects of both countries’ market capitalization and innovativeness as well as the 
effect of expected economic growth in the PC country are very robust towards excluding developing 
countries (Columns 3 and 4) and excluding the United States (Columns 5 and 6). Moreover, the deal 
size becomes significant in both subsample regressions, underpinning the necessity of a foreign VC’s 
participation when the deal size increases. 
In Panel B, we check whether the differences in macroeconomic factors have an impact on bilateral 
cross border deals. Only the coefficients on the differences in expected growth and personal taxes are 
statistically significant and positive, whereas all other differences are insignificant.  
4.5 Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of additional regressions in order to yield insights whether the results we have 
discussed above are sensitive to various sources of changes. First, we employ alternative measures of 
innovativeness (patent counts) and legal environment (more general legal indices). Second, we use a 
between estimation for the VC and the bilateral country perspective. These robustness checks broadly 
confirm our findings (results not reported but available upon request). 
5 Conclusion 
This paper extends the new literature on the factors that shape internationalization within venture 
capital industries by shedding light on the internationalization patterns and their drivers from four 
different perspectives: the perspective of the venture capitalist, the perspective of the portfolio 
company, the perspective of the portfolio companies’ country and bilateral country perspective. Our 
empirical evidence based on an extensive international dataset indicates that venture capitalist, 
portfolio company and deal characteristics drive the internationalization patterns. Domestically 
experienced venture capitalists seem to be able to exploit the advantages from internationalization 
more effectively than their less experienced counterparts. Another finding is that companies from IT, 
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machinery, and biotech sectors are more likely to be financed by foreign venture capitalists than 
companies in other industries. Finally, our results indicate that international venture capitalists are 
more important in larger deals, this effect being particularly pronounced in smaller countries.  
Internationalization patterns are shaped not only by venture capitalist, company and deal 
characteristics, but also by macroeconomic factors. Countries with higher expected growth, higher 
stock market capitalization and higher innovativeness are more successful in attracting domestic and 
foreign venture capitalists than countries with low growth chances, a poor stock market capitalization 
and low innovativeness. At the same time, venture capitalists located in countries with a higher stock 
market capitalization invest more often abroad than venture capitalists located in countries with a poor 
stock market capitalization. Moreover, our results are in line with the conjecture that high personal 
taxation increases individuals’ incentives to become entrepreneurs, leading to more venture capital 
activity from domestic and foreign venture capitalists in countries with high effective personal income 
tax rates.  
Our discussion of cross-border venture capital deals raises a couple of further research questions. First 
and foremost, in the international context, insights on how venture capitalists structure their portfolios 
not only in terms of the countries, but also of the industries they select would increase our 
understanding of the internationalization patterns. More specifically, it would be interesting to know 
whether country factors or sector factors drive the composition of venture capitalists’ portfolios. In 
addition, the entrance strategy of venture capitalists has not received much attention in the academic 
literature. In particular, the analysis of cross-border syndication, i.e. the joint investment by domestic 
and foreign VCs, would deserve a profound investigation, since managing a syndicate across borders 
is usually much more difficult than managing a local syndicate. Another interesting issue we have not 
discussed in this paper is the success of cross-border investments in terms of the performance of the 
portfolio companies as well as the venture capitalists’ returns. However, as a sizeable fraction of the 
deals occurred in the last three years and most of these deals are not exited yet, this investigation must 
be postponed until later. 
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Figure 1: Domestic and cross-border (intracontinental and intercontinental) VC – portfolio company links 
This figure depicts the number of domestic, cross-border intracontinental and cross-border intercontinental VC-portfolio company links within the period 2000-2008, aggregated by continents. Links 
refer to each single connection between a VC and a portfolio company.  
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of the deal size on the probability of a foreign VC’s participation in the 
portfolio company perspective 
This figure depicts the marginal effect of the log deal size on the probability that a foreign VC participates in a particular 
deal. Here, we consider that log deal size appears not only as one of the regressors, but also as part of the interaction term. 
The figure is based on the regression from the first column in Table 7 evaluated at different country size deciles and at the 































95% conf. interval 
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Table 1: The four perspectives of internationalization 
This table shows the internationalization patterns within the period 2000-2008 from four different perspectives. Panel A 
depicts the VCs’ average number of links to foreign and to domestic portfolio companies (VC perspective). Panel B shows 
the number of cross-border and domestic deals in the dataset (portfolio company perspective). Panel C reveals the number of 
cross-border and domestic deals carried out in each sample country (portfolio companies’ country perspective). Panel D 
reveals the number of bilateral cross-border VC-PC links for selected country pairs (bilateral country perspective).  
Panel A: VC perspective 
No. of VCs Average no. of cross-border links Average no. of domestic links 
8,211 1.45 5.68 
 
Panel B: Portfolio company (PC) perspective 
 No. of cross-border deals No. of domestic deals 
No. of deals (at least one foreign VC) (all VCs are domestic) 
23,826 7,947 15,879 
 








No. of domestic 
deals 
PC country 
(at least one 
foreign VC) 
(all VCs are 
domestic) PC country 
(at least one 
foreign VC) 
(all VCs are 
domestic) 
Australia 201 92 Lithuania 7 5 
Austria 44 45 Luxembourg 15 2 
Belgium 111 152 Malaysia 8 8 
Brazil 12 10 Netherlands 146 187 
Bulgaria 10 2 New Zealand 9 20 
Canada 387 686 Nigeria 1 1 
Chile 1 2 Norway 77 80 
China 270 84 Phillippines 2 0 
Czech Republic 7 3 Poland 24 13 
Denmark 107 112 Portugal 26 21 
Egypt 6 1 Russian Federation 38 19 
Estonia 6 3 Saudi Arabia 0 2 
Finland 111 162 Singapore 32 8 
France 503 1,140 South Africa 9 26 
Germany 390 620 Spain 117 489 
Greece 1 9 Sweden 244 380 
Hong Kong 17 2 Switzerland 115 39 
Hungary 10 6 Thailand 5 1 
India 184 75 Turkey 7 8 
Ireland 129 84 Ukraine 3 1 
Israel 298 198 United Kingdom 1,214 1,540 
Italy 155 124 United States 2,854 9,370 
Japan 28 24 Uruguay 0 1 
Jordan 1 1 Vietnam 5 21 
 
cont. on the next page 
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Table 1 – cont. 
Panel D: Bilateral country perspective 
 No. of bilateral cross-border links between VCs and portfolio companies for selected country pairs 




States Other Total 
Canada  4 7 4 6 4 43 492 70 630 
China 0  5 2 3 4 38 226 169 447 
France 16 0  49 6 12 232 199 271 785 
Germany 1 0 49  0 7 208 137 252 654 
Israel 9 0 14 47  3 49 289 55 466 
Sweden 2 0 14 9 1  89 45 150 310 
United Kingdom 14 8 86 82 21 18  663 445 1,337 
United States 515 28 226 397 508 125 923  1,543 4,265 
Other 17 3 159 196 8 111 492 742 648 2,376 
           
Total 574 43 560 786 553 284 2,074 2,793 3,603  
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Table 2: Domestic and cross-border venture capital deals over time and across industries  
This table demonstrates the development of domestic and cross-border venture capital deals over time (Panel A) and across 
industries (Panel B) within the period 2000-2008. 





No. of  
cross-border 
deals  
No. of  
total  
deals 
Share of  
cross-border on total 
deals (in %) 
2000 1,735 927 2,662 34.8 
2001 1,551 913 2,464 37.1 
2002 1,331 666 1,997 33.4 
2003 1,547 644 2,191 29.4 
2004 1,872 849 2,721 31.2 
2005 1,825 972 2,797 34.8 
2006 1,896 1,055 2,951 35.8 
2007 2,297 981 3,278 29.9 
2008 1,825 940 2,765 34.0 
      
Total 15,879 7,947 23,826 33.4 
 
 





No of.  
cross-border 
deals  
No. of  
total  
deals 
Share of  
cross-border on total 
deals (in %) 
Computer, IT and Internet Services 7,190 2,997 10,187 29.4 
Industrial, Electric and Electronic Machinery 2,417 1,268 3,685 34.4 
Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences 921 875 1,796 48.7 
Personal, Leisure and Business Services 1,849 824 2,673 30.8 
Communications 431 302 733 41.2 
Other  3,071 1,681 4,752 35.4 
     
Total 15,879 7,947 23,826 33.4 
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Table 3: Summary of the hypotheses 
This table summarizes our hypotheses for the four perspectives. While we are able to access the impact of the VC and deal characteristics on cross-border activity only in selected perspectives, we 
include the macroeconomic factors in all four perspectives. For variables descriptions and definitions see Table 4. 
 






  1a 1b 2 3 4 
  No. of cross-
border deals 
No. of domestic 
deals 
Probability of a foreign 
VC’s participation 
No. of cross-border deals in 
the PC country 
No. of bilateral cross-
border deals 




VC domestic experience H1 + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Deal size  n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Deal size interacted with PC-country size n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 




n.a. n.a. n.a. + + n.a. 
Expected growth H3 - + + + + - 
Market capitalization  H4 + + - + + + 
Innovativeness H5 - + + + + - 
Legal environment H6 - + + + + - 
H7a + - - - - + Personal taxation 
H7b - + + + + - 
      
REGRESSION RESULTS   TABLE 5 TABLE 6 TABLE 7 TABLE 8 TABLE 9 
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Table 4: Descriptions, sources and summary statistics for the regressors 
This table offers descriptions, sources and summary statistics of the regressors we use in our four perspective framework.  
 
Name Description Source Mean Std. Dev. 
     
VC domestic experience Annual number of domestic deals  Zephyr 0.63 2.21 
     
Deal size Deal value (thousands of euros) Zephyr 16,288.9 69,421.21 
     
Expected growth  Expected real GDP growth rate for the next 3-5 years Datastream 3.6 1.6 
Market capitalization Stock market capitalization/GDP www.worldbank.org 0.9 0.82 
Innovativeness Business R&D expenditures/GDP www.worldcompetitiveness.com 0.94 0.82 
Legal environment Venture capital legal index (higher value is better) www.worldcompetitiveness.com 5.11 1.36 
Personal taxation Effective personal income tax rate (%) www.worldcompetitiveness.com 17.8 9.4 
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Table 5: Cross-border deals in the VC perspective 
This table depicts the results from fixed effect Poisson models. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border links 
counted for each VC in each year within the period 2001-2008. A fixed effect is modelled for each VC. All RHS variables 
are defined in Table 4 and are based on the countries in which the VCs are located. Innovativeness is measured by the 
business R&D expenditures; the legal environment is captured by the venture capital legal index. Robust standard errors 
(Wooldridge 1999) are in parentheses. ***, **, *, ^ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
    
log(VC dom. experience), lagged 0.4285*** 0.4303*** 0.3899*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.122) 
Expected growth  -0.1459^ -0.1634^ -0.1632* 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.089) 
Market capitalization, lagged 0.3595* 0.3342* 0.4168** 
 (0.190) (0.197) (0.200) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.4289 0.4148 1.0481** 
 (0.494) (0.505) (0.458) 
Legal environment, lagged -0.2594^ -0.2645^ -0.2963* 
 (0.177) (0.181) (0.173) 
Personal taxation, lagged -0.0188^ -0.0196^ 0.0085 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
    
year dummies yes yes yes 
VC fixed effects  yes yes yes 
    
χ2 210.54*** 210.10*** 159.01*** 
Number of observations 18,064 17,368 11,968 
Number of VCs 2,258 2,171 1,496 
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Table 6: Domestic deals in the VC perspective 
This table depicts results from fixed effect Poisson models. The dependent variable is the number of domestic links counted 
for each VC in each year within the period 2000-2008. A fixed effect is modelled for each VC. All RHS variables are defined 
in Table 4 and are based on the countries in which the VCs are located. Innovativeness is measured by the business R&D 
expenditures; the legal environment is captured by the venture capital legal index. Robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1999) 
are in parentheses. ***, **, *, ^ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
Expected growth  0.1424*** 0.0756** 0.1567*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.039) 
Market capitalization, lagged 0.7556*** 0.6053*** 0.8597*** 
 (0.105) (0.119) (0.121) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.4177*** 0.2376^ 0.5215*** 
 (0.161) (0.160) (0.198) 
Legal environment, lagged 0.0299 0.0228 0.0358 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) 
Personal taxation, lagged 0.0064 0.0059 0.0193* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
    
year dummies yes yes yes 
VC fixed effects  yes yes yes 
    
χ2 386.74*** 306.95*** 227.93*** 
Number of observations 63,819 61,632 28,143 
Number of VCs 7,091 6,848 3,127 
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Table 7: The probability of a foreign VC’s participation in the portfolio company perspective 
This table depicts the coefficients (Panel A) and the marginal effects (Panel B) from logit models for the probability that a 
foreign VC participates in a particular deal for the period 2000-2008. All RHS variables are defined in Table 4 and are based 
on the country in which the portfolio companies are located. Innovativeness is measured by the business R&D expenditures; 
the legal environment is captured by the venture capital legal index. Huber-White-sandwich robust standard errors (Huber 
1967, White 1980) are in parentheses. ***, **, *, ^ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level. 
Panel A: Coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
log(Deal size) 3.0912*** 3.2153*** 1.5791*** 
 (0.330) (0.350) (0.496) 
log(Deal size)Xlog(Country size) -0.0872*** -0.0912*** -0.0306* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) 
Expected growth  0.1320** 0.1505** 0.1762*** 
 (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) 
Market capitalization, lagged -0.5237*** -0.6396*** -0.5221*** 
 (0.133) (0.161) (0.142) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.5440*** 0.7268*** 0.249 
 (0.211) (0.230) (0.229) 
Legal environment, lagged 0.2713*** 0.2779*** 0.2970*** 
 (0.072) (0.078) (0.080) 
Personal taxation, lagged 0.0162 0.0187 0.0161 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Industry dummies    
…Computer, IT and Internet Services 0.3126*** 0.3317*** 0.4258*** 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.077) 
…Industrial, Electric and Electronic Machinery 0.4260*** 0.4521*** 0.2703*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.088) 
…Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences 0.8961*** 0.9176*** 0.5529*** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.110) 
…Personal, Leisure and Business Services 0.1614** 0.1744** 0.0868 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.097) 
…Communications 0.1567 0.1179 0.4638*** 
 (0.110) (0.114) (0.156) 
    
year dummies yes yes yes 
PC-country dummies yes yes yes 
    
χ2 2541.23*** 2239.56*** 1392.52*** 
Number of observations (deals) 19,107 18,451 8,263 
 
 
cont. on the next page 
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Table 7 – cont. 
Panel B: Marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
log(Deal size) 0.1232*** 0.1213*** 0.1812*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) 
Expected growth  0.0283** 0.0314** 0.0433*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Market capitalization, lagged -0.1124*** -0.1336*** -0.1283*** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.035) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.1168*** 0.1518*** 0.0612 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.056) 
Legal environment, lagged 0.0582*** 0.0580*** 0.0730*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) 
Personal taxation, lagged 0.0035 0.0039 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry dummies    
…Computer, IT and Internet Services 0.0674*** 0.0696*** 0.1050*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
…Industrial, Electric and Electronic Machinery 0.0958*** 0.0997*** 0.0670*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) 
…Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences 0.2114*** 0.2135*** 0.1373*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) 
…Personal, Leisure and Business Services 0.0354** 0.0374** 0.0214 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) 
…Communications 0.0345 0.0252 0.1154*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) 
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Table 8: Number of cross-border deals in the perspective of the portfolio companies’ country 
This table depicts results from fixed effect Poisson models. The dependent variable is for each portfolio companies’ country 
and each year within the period 2000-2008 the number of deals in which at least one foreign VC participates. A fixed effect 
is modelled for the portfolio companies’ countries. All RHS variables are defined in Table 4 and are based on the countries in 
which portfolio companies are located. Innovativeness is measured by the business R&D expenditures; the legal environment 
is captured by the venture capital legal index. Robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1999) are in parentheses. ***, **, *, ^ denote 
significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
log(Deal size, 75th pct.)  0.005  0.0428  0.0186 
  (0.075)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
Expected growth  0.2509*** 0.2286*** 0.1432*** 0.1393*** 0.2612*** 0.2365*** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.054) 
Market capitalization, lagged 0.6909*** 0.6564*** 0.3073* 0.3180** 0.7690*** 0.7322*** 
 (0.168) (0.155) (0.157) (0.155) (0.172) (0.156) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.5640 0.3685 0.2929* 0.2307^ 0.5690 0.3623 
 (0.440) (0.329) (0.174) (0.149) (0.496) (0.367) 
Legal environment, lagged 0.0974^ 0.0885 0.0717 0.0711^ 0.076 0.0637 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.050) (0.047) (0.072) (0.083) 
Personal taxation, lagged 0.0166^ 0.0143^ 0.0099 0.0091 0.0213^ 0.0179 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) 
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
χ2 1311.58*** 1485.97*** 1000.37*** 1618.79*** 610.51*** 722.60*** 
Number of PC countries 39 36 26 26 38 35 
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Table 9: Number of cross-border VC-portfolio company links in the bilateral country perspective 
This table depicts results from fixed effect Poisson models. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border links 
between VCs and portfolio companies counted for each country pair and each year within the period 2000-2008. A fixed 
effect is modelled for each country pair. All RHS variables are defined in Table 4. PC denotes the portfolio companies’ 
country, and VC denotes the VCs’ country. Innovativeness is measured by the business R&D expenditures; the legal 
environment is captured by the venture capital legal index. In Panel A, PC-country and VC-country macroeconomic factors 
are included separately in the models, while in Panel B, the difference in the macroeconomic factors between the PC country 
and the VC country are used. Robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1999) are in parentheses. ***, **, *, ^ denote significance at 
the 1, 5, 10, and 15 percent level.    
Panel A: Macroeconomic factors of the PC and VC countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Whole sample Developed countries Without US 
       
log(Deal size, 75th percentile)  0.0647  0.1239**  0.1241** 
(PC)  (0.056)  (0.050)  (0.057) 
Expected growth  0.6346*** 0.6010*** 0.2159* 0.2505* 0.7050*** 0.6827*** 
(PC) (0.151) (0.154) (0.127) (0.130) (0.223) (0.223) 
Expected growth  0.3772*** 0.3720*** 0.2680* 0.2701* 0.4553*** 0.4459*** 
(VC) (0.127) (0.127) (0.147) (0.148) (0.116) (0.115) 
Market capitalization, lagged 0.2251*** 0.2123*** 0.1378*** 0.1391*** 0.1449*** 0.1332*** 
(PC) (0.043) (0.041) (0.028) (0.028) (0.049) (0.048) 
Market capitalization, lagged 0.0045 0.0067 0.0035 0.0029 -0.0194 -0.0169 
(VC) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.7093** 0.4957* 0.4048** 0.2993* 0.7958*** 0.6256** 
(PC) (0.359) (0.283) (0.184) (0.163) (0.298) (0.276) 
Innovativeness, lagged 0.5135** 0.5065** 0.4072* 0.4237* 0.9601** 0.9455** 
(VC) (0.237) (0.233) (0.226) (0.229) (0.379) (0.371) 
Legal environment, lagged 0.085 0.0738 0.0527 0.0561 0.0075 -0.0076 
(PC) (0.064) (0.072) (0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.068) 
Legal environment, lagged -0.0186 -0.0266 -0.0346 -0.0358 0.0535 0.0475 
(VC) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.065) (0.064) 
Personal taxation, lagged 0.0182^ 0.0151 0.0103 0.0086 0.0077 0.0072 
(PC) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Personal taxation, lagged -0.0088 -0.0089 -0.0112 -0.0115 -0.0006 -0.0004 
(VC) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
       
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country-pair fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
χ2 243.77*** 239.13*** 211.27*** 215.66*** 185.42***   197.36*** 
Number of country pairs 418 412 318 317 348 344 
Number of observations 3,762 3,527 2,862 2,774 3,132 2,951 
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Table 9 – cont. 
Panel B: Difference in macroeconomic factors of the PC country and the VC country 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Whole sample  Developed countries Without US  
    
Expected growth difference 0.1254*** 0.0530** 0.1142*** 
(PC minus VC) (0.040) (0.027) (0.038) 
Market capitalization, lagged diff. 0.1568 -0.071 0.1716 
(PC minus VC) (0.147) (0.114) (0.210) 
Innovativeness, lagged difference -0.0739 -0.0823 -0.1911 
(PC minus VC) (0.228) (0.156) (0.318) 
Legal environment, lagged difference 0.0132 0.0243 -0.0690^ 
(PC minus VC) (0.044) (0.035) (0.047) 
Personal taxation, lagged difference 0.0189** 0.0126* 0.009 
(PC minus VC) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) 
    
year dummies yes yes yes 
country-pair fixed effects yes yes yes 
    
χ2 207.68*** 190.00*** 107.28*** 
Number of country pairs 418 318 348 
Number of observations 3,762 2,862 3,132 
 
